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Multiple equilibria in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy : a comment

By Amrita Dhillon and Ben Lockwood

Abstract

The Besley-Coate model of representative democracy has the problem of multiple equilibria (Besley-Coate, 1997). We show that requiring the Besley-Coate political equilibria to be iteratively undominated at the voting stage refines the set of (pure strategy) political equilibrium outcomes only for those cases where at least four candidates stand for election. This note complements the results of De Sinopoli and Turrini (1999)

Topics: HB
Publisher: Blackwell
DOI identifier: 10.1111/1467-9779.00094
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:13

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