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Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations

By Francis Bloch and Bhaskar Dutta


This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games\ud and in games with positive externalities and binary actions

Topics: HB
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2006
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