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Status equilibrium in local public good economies

By Anne van den Nouweland and Myrna Holtz Wooders

Abstract

We define a concept of status equilibrium for local public good economies. A status equilibrium specifies one status index for each agent in an economy. These indices determine agents' cost shares in any possible jurisdiction. We provide an axiomatic characterization of status equilibrium using consistency properties

Topics: HB, HM
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2005
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:1462

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Citations

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