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Imitation and the emergence of Nash equilibrium play in games with many players

By Edward Cartwright

Abstract

We model a learning dynamic in which players imitate and innovate. Of interest is to question whether Nash equilibrium play emerges, and if so, the role that imitation plays in this emergence. Our main result provides a general class of coordination games for which approximate Nash equilibrium play does emerge. Important conditions include that players imitate "similar" individuals. The role of imitation in learning is discussed in the context of two examples where it is shown that imitation can lead to pareto superio outcomes

Topics: HB, QA
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2003
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:1506

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