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Candidate stability and voting correspondences

By Carmelo Rodríguez-Alvarez

Abstract

For each set of candidates at state and each profile of voters' preferences over running candidates a voting corresponsence selects a set of candidates. following Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (Econometrica 2001) a voting correspondence is candidate stable if a candidate never benefits from withdrawing unilateraly her candidacy. If candidates cannot vote and compare sets of candidates according to their expected utility conditional on some prior probability assessment only dictatorial voting correspondences are candidate stable and unanimous. If the assessments are restricted to be uniform, rules that select the set of best candidates of tww fixed voters are also allowed. We also analyze other domains of preferences fitting extreme attitudes towards risk in which positive results are obtained

Topics: HB, QA
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2003
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:1523

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