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Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs

By Alexander Kovalenkov and Myrna Holtz Wooders


We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results

Topics: HB, QA
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2002
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:1556

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