Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Government collusion in Janeba’s model of multijurisdictional tax competition

By Lloyd Barton


Eckhard Janeba (Dec 2000 “Tax Competition when Governments lack Commitment” American Economic Review 90, 1508-19) has recently suggested a novel approach to modelling the relationship between governments and multinational firms. As part of ongoing research into various aspects of multijurisdictional tax competition, this paper investigates the possibility of allowing for collusion between governments when setting tax rates in the model. The findings show that a self-enforcing agreement is possible, with the beneficial effect of cutting the firm’s excess profits, limiting investment in excess capacity, and raising government revenue

Topics: HJ
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2001
OAI identifier:

Suggested articles


  1. (1999). Implementing Tax Coordination” doi

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.