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Time-inconsistent candidates vs. time-inconsistent voters: imperfect policy commitment in political equilibrium

By Marco Pani and Carlo Perroni


This paper examines whether policy commitment mechanisms, when available, will be used by the elected policymaker in a political-economy equilibrium. We describe a two-period repeated voting model where second-period outcomes depend on commitment choices made by an elected policymaker in the first period, and where elected candidates may choose to deviate from their preferred level of commitment, retaining discretionary control of policy variables, in order to secure a favourable second-period political outcome. The implications of different political tenure systems for the candidates who are elected, the policy targets that are selected, the degree of commitment to their implementation, and the policies that are actually implemented in the model are examined

Topics: JF
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 1999
OAI identifier:

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