Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling: an empirical analysis

By Silvia Marchesi

Abstract

The existence of an empirical relationship between the adoption of an IMF programme and the concession of a debt rescheduling by commercial and official creditors is tested using a bivariate probit model. If countries who have arrangements with the IMF are more likely than others to obtain a rescheduling of their external debt we could conclude that the adoption of an IMF programme could work as a sort of signal of a country's "good willingness", which is thus rewarded with the debt relief. The results confirm the existence of a significant effect of the adoption of an IMF programme on the subsequent concession of a debt rescheduling by creditors

Topics: HJ
Publisher: University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Year: 2000
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:2069

Suggested articles

Citations

  1. (1984). A survey of the quantitative approaches to country risk analysis.” doi
  2. (1991). Ability and willingness to service debt as explanation for commercial and official rescheduling cases.” doi
  3. (1992). Country balance sheet data vs. traditional macro variables in a logit model to predict debt rescheduling.” doi
  4. (1997). Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries and the HIPC Initiative.” doi
  5. (1981). Debt with Potential Repudation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis'' doi
  6. (1990). Econometric Analysis.” doi
  7. (1997). Economic Determinants of IMF financial arrangements.” doi
  8. (1999). IMF conditionality as a screening device.” doi
  9. (1994). IMF lending programs: participation and impact.” doi
  10. (1995). IMF Lending to Developing Countries: Issues and Evidence.” doi
  11. (1995). IMF Programmes in Developing Countries. Design and Impact.” Routledge, London and doi
  12. (1995). International debt re-examined.”
  13. (1983). Limited-Dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics.” doi
  14. (1995). Rescheduling of the Sovereign Debt: A New Role for the Paris Club.”
  15. (1988). The Debt Crisis.” doi
  16. (1987). The demand for IMF credits by sub-Saharan doi
  17. (1992). The economic characteristics of IMF program countries.” doi
  18. (1996). Three approaches to predict the timing and quantity of LDC debt rescheduling.” doi

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.