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Resource allocation games of various social objectives

By Bo Chen and Sinan Gürel


In this paper, we study resource allocation games of two different cost components for individual game players and various social costs. The total cost of each individual player consists of the congestion cost, which is the same for all players sharing the same resource, and resource activation cost, which is proportional to the individual usage of the resource. The social costs we consider are, respectively, the total of costs of all players and the maximum congestion cost plus total resource activation cost.\ud Using the social costs we assess the quality of Nash equilibria in terms of the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS). For each problem, we identify one or two problem parameters and provide parametric bounds on the PoA and PoS. We show that they are unbounded in general if the parameter involved are not restricted

Topics: QA, HM
Publisher: Springer New York LLC
OAI identifier:

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