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Stability vs. optimality in selfish ring routing

By Bo Chen, Xujin Chen, J. Hu and Xiaodong Hu


We study the asymmetric atomic selfish routing in ring networks, which has diverse practical applications in network design and analysis. We are concerned with minimizing the maximum latency of source-destination node-pairs over links with linear latencies. We obtain the first constant upper bound on the price of anarchy and significantly improve the existing upper bounds on the price of stability. Moreover, we show that any optimal solution is a good approximate Nash equilibrium. Finally, we present better performance analysis and fast implementation of pseudo-polynomial algorithms for computing approximate Nash equilibria

Topics: QA
Publisher: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
OAI identifier:

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