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Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems

By Francisco Carreras Escobar, Josep Freixas Bosch and Antonio Magaña Nieto


An analysis of three major aspects has been carried out that may apply to any of the successive voting systems used for the European Union Council of Ministers, from the first one established in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to the current one established in Lisbon. We mainly consider the voting systems designed for the enlarged European Union adopted in the Athens summit, held in April 2003 but this analysis can be applied to any other system. First, it is shown that the dimension of these voting systems does not, in general, reduce. Next, the egalitarian effects of superposing two or three weighted majority games (often by introducing additional consensus) are considered. Finally, the decisiveness of these voting systems is evaluated and compared.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Topics: Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística, Game theory, Decision making--Mathematical models, Voting--Mathematical models, Dimension, Egalitarianism, Decisiveness, Voting systems, Simple games, Weighted majority games, Shapley–Shubik power index, Jocs, Teoria de, Decisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics, Vot -- Models matemàtics, Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory, Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91B Mathematical economics
Year: 2016
DOI identifier: 10.5277/ord160203
OAI identifier:

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