This thesis concerns the relation between the fundamental properties and the powers they confer. The views\ud considered are introduced in terms of their acceptance or rejection of the quiddistic thesis. Essentially the\ud quiddistic thesis claims that properties confer the powers they do neither necessarily nor sufficiently.\ud Quidditism is the view that accepts the quiddistic thesis. The other two views to be considered, the pure powers\ud view and the grounded view reject the quiddistic thesis. The pure powers view supports its denial of the\ud quiddistic thesis with the claim that properties consist in conferring the powers they do; the possession of a\ud property just is the possession of a power. The grounded view, the positive view of this thesis, rejects the idea\ud that properties are constituted by conferring the causal powers they do. Rather on the grounded view, it is the\ud natures of the fundamental properties that metaphysically explain why they confer the powers they do
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