Theoretical models of trade blocs and integrated markets
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Abstract
This thesis consists of four main chapters, together with a general introduction and
conclusion. The thesis examines, both separately and together, the formation of trade
blocs and global market integration. All the models use a partial equilibrium
framework, with firms competing as Cournot oligopolists.
Chapter 2 presents two models of trade bloc formation under segmented markets. In
the first model, with common constant marginal costs, global free trade is optimal for
all countries when there are no more than four countries, but with five or more
countries there is an incentive to form a trade bloc containing most countries, but
excluding at least one. The second model introduces a cost function where a firm's
marginal cost is lower when it is located in a larger trade bloc, with little effect on the
results. Chapter 3 analyses the formation of trade blocs between countries with
different market sizes under segmented markets. The formation of a two country
customs union or free trade area will always raise the smaller country's welfare, while
the larger country will usually lose from a free trade area, and sometimes from a
customs union.
Chapter 4, which is joint work with David R. Collie and Morten Hviid, presents a
model of strategic trade policy under integrated markets, under complete and
incomplete information. In the former case, a low cost country will give an export
subsidy which is fully countervailed by the high cost country's import tariff. In the
simultaneous signalling game, each country's expected welfare is higher than under
free trade. Chapter 5 considers models of trade bloc formation under integrated
markets. With common constant costs, there is no incentive for blocs to form. When
costs are decreasing in membership of a bloc, either global free trade is optimal or
countries would prefer to belong to the smaller of two blocs