Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository


By Li-Hsien Chien, Shu-Hui Chang, 簡立賢 and 張淑惠


Based on the data from the imported rice quota auction system during 2003 to 2006, this study adopts the common value approach to measure the bidders' actual pricing decisions and their bidding behaviors. Major results indicate that: to increase the expected profit, public administrator can improve the current system by allowing more qualified bidders to enter the game or dynamiting the based price to affect the pricing behavior to the imported rice quota of bidders. Besides, no significant statistical finding for the winner's curse concern is approved in the current rice auction system in Taiwan.本文以2003至2006年國內稻米進口權利金(import option premium)拍賣資料為例,針對稻米進口權利金標售制度,以共同價值模型分析糧商投標之評價及投標行為。主要統計結果顯示:政府可以透過調整相關拍賣制度,如增加得標的糧商家數、或是機動訂定投標的底價等措施,達到影響糧商對於進口稻米權利金水準的評價(pricing)行為,進而有效增加政府的預期拍賣收入。另外,我國進口稻米標售制度受贏家詛咒(winner's curse)影響之假說,並不顯著為統計結果所支持

Topics: Common-value model, Rice quota, Import option premium, Winner's curse, 共同價值模型, 稻米進口配額, 進口權利金拍賣, 贏家詛咒
Publisher: 臺中巿: 國立中興大學農學院
Year: 2014
OAI identifier:
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • (external link)
  • Suggested articles

    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.