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On the effectiveness of liability rules when agents are not identical

By La Jolla (United States)) San Diego J. (California Univ. Sobel, W. Emons, Bonn Univ. (Germany). Sonderforschungsbereich 303 - Information und die Koordination Wirtschaftlicher Aktivitaeten and Bonn (Germany) Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)

Abstract

SIGLETIB Hannover: RO 2708(212) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Topics: 05D - Economics, economic theory
Year: 1988
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Provided by: OpenGrey Repository
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