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Sicherung von Industrieanlagen gegen Eingriffe Unbefugter (Vorsorge/Nachsorge/Schutz). Untersuchung der Moeglichkeiten zum Ausschlusss so genannter 'Innentaeter' und Geheimnisschutz von Unterlagen. T. A.1: Sicherheitsueberpruefung von Mitarbeitern

By H. Begona, U. Neuser, Trier (Germany) Ecoteam GmbH, Berlin (Germany) Siederer und Coll. Groth Anwaltskanzlei Gassner and Berlin (Germany) Umweltbundesamt

Abstract

In order to prevent major accidents the operators of industrial establishments under the German Stoerfall-Verordnung are obliged to consider 'unauthorized intervention' which can cause Major Accidents. As a consequence of the terroristic attacks of 11th September 2001 in the United States, politically or ideologically motivated attacks on industrial establishments can no longer be regarded as 'reasonably not to consider' in Germany. In October 2002 the German Hazardous Incidents Commission published a guideline 'Combating Interference by Unauthorized Persons' which gave first adopted recommendations on the security requirements against attacks from outside. It remained to evaluate how operators may improve the security against deliberate acts by insiders (part A) and which requirements have to be fulfilled if the access of the public to information on industrial installations shall be restricted (part B). Part A.1 evaluates the possibility of security screening on trustworthiness of employees as a prevention measure against deliberate acts of politically or ideologically motivated internal offenders on the basis of the Security Screening Law, considering the corresponding regulations and procedures of the Air Traffic and Nuclear Law. A procedure to identify the staff requiring security screening at hazardous facilities is proposed. Part A.2 deals with intended harmful behaviour of employees for reasons of dissatisfaction, anger or due to working conditions. Known motives and root causes for the development of motives were analyzed. Several strategies to prevent the development of motives were analysed and evaluated to be a part of an overall prevention concept. Part A.2 is completed by a manual for good practice in the prevention of intended harmful behaviour of employees in organizations. Part B evaluates the conditions to be fulfilled to allow restrictions of the free access to documents including information on hazardous installations (e.g. the safety report) for reasons of public safety. Considering the relevant legislation (Federal Impact Protection Law and Environmental Information Law) decision criterias for the restriction of the rights on free access to information are laid down and applied on two safety reports as examples. (orig.)Published in 3 volumesAvailable from TIB Hannover: RN 8422(2004,25) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekSIGLEBundesministerium fuer Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, Bonn (Germany)DEGerman

Topics: 05J - Political science, public administration, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, CHEMICAL PLANTS, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, PERSONNEL, IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS, MAN-MACHINE SYSTEMS, PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ERRORS, PHYSICAL PROTECTION DEVICES, MANAGEMENT, SABOTAGE, RELIABILITY, SECURITY, SECRECY PROTECTION, HAZARDS, RISK ASSESSMENT
Year: 2004
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Provided by: OpenGrey Repository
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