In this paper we develop a system of deontic logic (LAO, the logic of actual
obligation) with a rather limited scope: we are, only interested in obligations as far
as they: are relevant for deciding what actions actually ought to be done in a
particular situation, given some normative system N. In fact we are interested how
actual obligations are derived from the prima facie ones implied by N. Hence
statements expressing that certain states of affairs are obligatory, such as "the
speed-limit ought to be 140 in stead of 100", fall out of the scope. (Roughly
speaking LAO is what Castaneda calls a logic of "ought-to-do". (cf. [C]).) Since in
LAO actions can be obligatory while assertions cannot, actions and assertions
have to be strictly separated in the language of LAO
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