We propose a model of the transition from a ”big man” authoritarian regime to either a
liberal democracy or a communist regime. An underground organization votes on
whether to summon a mass event. If it is summoned, the organization members decide
whether to put effort into the event. Higher effort makes regime change more likely, but
it is individually risky. This creates the possibility, in principle, of high and low effort
equilibria. But we show, using weak dominance arguments, that only the high effort
equilibrium is ”credible.” Thus, internal party democracy is shown to be an efficiency
enhancing element for political transitions. We extend the model to show that other
internal organization aspects are key for the existence and welfare properties of this
equilibrium. Finally we also show when is the process likely to end up in either
democracy (and its ”quality”) or a full communist regime
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