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Fishery management games: how to admit new members and reduce harvestin levels

By Kim Hang Pham Do, H. Folmer and H. Norde

Abstract

This paper applies game theory to address the problem of allocating profits among fishing nations, once the countries concerned have expressed an interest in achieving an agreement through a Regional Fishery Management Organization (RFMO). Proposing the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for division of profits, we argue that existing RFMOs can be expanded by means of the Shapley value. We also show that adjustment from the Nash equilibrium to sustainable or more efficient can be achieved by means of the proportional rule without harming any of the countries involved

Topics: Leerstoelgroep Economie van consumenten en huishoudens, Economics of Consumers and Households Group, Economie van Consumenten en Huishoudens, Economics of Consumers and Households, Urban Economics, Urban Economics, MGS, MGS
Year: 2008
OAI identifier: oai:library.wur.nl:wurpubs/375888
Provided by: Wageningen Yield
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