Negotiating the effects of uncertainty? The governance capacity of collective bargaining under pressure

Abstract

The article makes four main arguments. First, that collective bargaining has the capacity to mitigate the negative externalities arising from market volatility, and the process of marketization, by establishing arrangements which provide substantive and procedural certainty for both workers and employers, and in particular greater security for workers. Secondly, that multi-employer bargaining arrangements are better equipped to fulfil this function than single-employer ones. Thirdly, that there are institutional differences amongst multi-employer bargaining arrangements concerning governance of bargaining at the company level which considerably influence their capacity to promote certainty and security. Fourthly, that under the pressures brought about by the crisis, the marketization of multi-employer collective bargaining is being accelerated either by the parties themselves or, more disruptively, by intervention from governments under pressure from international and European institutions, with potentially damaging consequences for the ability to address negative externalities