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Leave truth alone: on deflationism and contextualism

By Daniel Whiting

Abstract

According to deflationism, grasp of the concept of truth consists in nothing more than a disposition to accept a priori (non-paradoxical) instances of the schema:<br/>(DS) It is true that p if and only if p<br/>According to contextualism, the same expression with the same meaning might, on different occasions of use, express different propositions bearing different truth-conditions (where this does not result from indexicality and the like).On this view, what is expressed in an utterance depends in a non-negligible way on the circumstances. Charles Travis claims that contextualism shows that ‘deflationism is a mistake’, that truth is a more substantive notion than deflationism allows. In this paper, I examine Travis's arguments in support of this ‘inflationary’ claim and argue that they are unsuccessful

Topics: B1
Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.soton.ac.uk:67583
Provided by: e-Prints Soton

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