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Communication equilibria with . . .

By Françoise Forges and Frédéric Koessler

Abstract

This paper studies the set of equilibria that can be achieved by adding general communication systems to Bayesian games in which some information can be certified or, equivalently, in which players’ types are partially verifiable. Given the information that players are able to certify, we characterize outcomeequivalent canonical equilibria for which generalized versions of the revelation principle are valid. Communication equilibria and associated canonical representations are obtained as special cases when no information can be certified

Topics: Bayesian game, Communication equilibrium, Information certification, Revelation principle, Verifiable types
Year: 2003
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.418.5942
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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