Location of Repository

The Cubic Maximum Social Cost Verifies the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture ∗

By Marios Mavronicolas and Andreas Pieris

Abstract

The Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture is a well-studied conjecture in Algorithmic Game Theory with many facets. It refers to the general setting of scheduling n (weighted) selfish users on m (related or unrelated) links; it states that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium (when existing) maximizes Social Cost, some specific measure of social welfare. Previous works have either verified or refuted the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture in several particular instances of the general setting. In this work, we continue the study of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture. We consider the special case where users are unweighted, there are m = 2 identical links, and Social Cost is the expectation of the cube of the maximum latency on a link. We extend the techniques and analysis by Feldmann et al. [4] for the case where Social Cost were the expectation of the square of the maximum latency on a link; hereby, we establish the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture for this special case. 2

Year: 2014
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.415.505
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/v... (external link)
  • http://aeolus.ceid.upatras.gr/... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.