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Health- Promoting Alliances: A Cooperative- Game ApproachHEALTH-PROMOTING ALLIANCES: A COOPERATIVE-GAME APPROACH By

By Daniel Arce, Joint Robert Mccallum, Robert R, Katheryn A, Daniel G. Arce M, Robert D. Mccallum, Distinguished Professor, Todd Sandler, Robert R and Katheryn A. Dockson Professor


This paper explores how nations can save on prophylactic costs by allying to forestall the spread of a disease or a pest. The distribution of the cost savings among the participants is shown to depend on the configuration of nations and the pathway of the pathogens. Alternative ethical or normative considerations may alter the distribution of the benefits achieved through cooperation. In some cases, a country’s position and size matters, while, in other cases, they do not affect a member’s relative share. The analysis demonstrates why a country like the US may be motivated to underwrite the Centers for Disease Control even when the US is not directly at risk. A cooperative-game analysis of burden sharing differs greatly from a noncooperative one. Our analysis also applies to a host of security issues. JEL classifications

Year: 2001
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