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Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching

By Scott Duke Kominers

Abstract

In this note, we demonstrate that the problem of “many-to-one matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues ” is actually more difficult than the classical many-to-one matching problem, “matching without preferences over colleagues. ” We give an explicit reduction of any problem of the latter type to a problem of the former type. This construction leads to the first algorithm which finds all stable matchings in the setting of “matching without preferences over colleagues, ” for any set of preferences. Our construction directly extends to generalized matching settings

Topics: Key words, many-to-one matching, stability, matching algorithms. JEL, C78, D71
Year: 2013
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.362.8549
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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