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Logit Dynamics: A Model for Bounded Rationality DIODATO FERRAIOLI

By Universit√© Paris Dauphine

Abstract

We describe logit dynamics, which are used to model bounded rationality in games, and their related equilibrium concept, the logit equilibrium. We also present some results about the convergence time of these dynamics and introduce a suitable approximation of the logit equilibrium. We conclude by describing some interesting future extensions to logit dynamics

Topics: Categories and Subject Descriptors, J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences, Economics General Terms, Theory, Economics, Performance Additional Key Words and Phrases, Bounded Rationality, Equilibrium Concept, Game Dynamics
Year: 2013
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.352.8641
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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