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Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games *

By Timothy N. Cason A, Anya C. Savikhin B and Roman M. Sheremeta C

Abstract

Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investigate behavioral spillovers for minimum- and median-effort coordination games. Subjects play these coordination games simultaneously and sequentially. The results show that successful coordination on the Pareto optimal equilibrium in the median game influences behavior in the minimum game when the games are played sequentially. Moreover, this positive, Pareto-improving spillover is present even when group composition changes across games, although the effect is not as strong. We also find that the precedent for uncooperative behavior in the minimum game does not influence play in the median game. These findings suggest guidelines for increasing cooperative behavior within organizations

Topics: JEL Classifications, C72, C91 Keywords, coordination, order-statistic games, experiments, cooperation, minimum game, median game, behavioral spillover
Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.352.7812
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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