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OSHA Inspections 1990-2010*

By Juergen Jung and Michael D. MakowskyJuergen Jung and Michael D. Makowsky

Abstract

We explore the determinants of inspection outcomes across 1.6 million Occupational Safety and Health Agency audits from 1990 through 2010. We find that discretion in enforcement differs in state and federally conducted inspections. State agencies are more sensitive to local economic conditions, finding fewer standard violations and fewer serious violations as unemployment increases. Larger companies receive greater lenience in multiple dimensions. Inspector issued fines and final fines, after negotiated reductions, are both smaller during Republican presidencies. Quantile regression analysis reveals that Presidential and Congressional party affiliations have their greatest impact on the larges

Topics: JEL Codes, K23, H73, I18 Key Words, Regulation, Enforcement, Occupational Safety, Decentralization
Year: 2013
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.352.2255
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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