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Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types

By Yeon-koo Che and Ian GaleYeon-koo Che and Ian Gale

Abstract

This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders ’ types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and face financial constraints. This revenue ranking extends to risk-averse bidders with general forms of nonexpected utility preferences

Year: 2013
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.319.1819
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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