oaioai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:39309

Reasoning-based introspection

Authors
Publication date
25 October 2011
Publisher
Springer
Doi

    Abstract

    We show that if an agent reasons according to standard inference rules, the truth and introspection axioms extend from the set of non-epistemic propositions to the whole set of propositions. This implies that the usual axiomatization of partitional possibility correspondences is redundant, and provides a justification for truth and introspection that is partly based on reasoning

    Similar works

    Full text

    thumbnail-image

    LSE Research Online

    redirect
    oaioai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:39309
    Last time updated on 10/02/2012

    This paper was published in LSE Research Online.

    Having an issue?

    Is data on this page outdated, violates copyrights or anything else? Report the problem now and we will take corresponding actions after reviewing your request.