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Fiscal policy instruments and the political economy of designing programs to reach the poorest

By Ehtisham Ahmad

Abstract

No Abstrac

Topics: DS Asia, HC Economic History and Conditions, HJ Public Finance
Publisher: Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2009
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:38344
Provided by: LSE Research Online

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Citations

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  7. (2006). Normative versus positive theories of revenue assignments,” in Ehtisham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio doi
  8. (2006). Productividad, crecimiento y pobreza en México: Que sigue después de Progresa-Oportunidades?,
  9. (2006). Subnational public financial management: institutions and macroeconomic considerations,” in Ahmad and Brosio doi
  10. (2006). The political economy of decentralization,” in Ahmad and Brosio doi
  11. (1993). The principles of targeting,”
  12. (2003). Why Conditional Aid Does Not work and What can be Done About it?” doi

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