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The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management

By Alessandro Tavoni, Maja Schlüter and Simon Levin

Abstract

This paper examines the role of other-regarding behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource, we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment

Topics: GE Environmental Sciences, JZ International relations
Publisher: Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:37571
Provided by: LSE Research Online

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