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A New Family of Practical Non-Malleable Diffie-Hellman Protocols

By Andrew C. Yao and Yunlei Zhao

Abstract

Cryptography algorithm standards play a key role both to the practice of information security and to cryptography theory research. Among them, the MQV and HMQV protocols ((H)MQV, in short) are a family of (implicitly authenticated) Diffie-Hellman key-exchange (DHKE) protocols that are widely standardized and deployed. In this work, from some new perspectives and approaches and under some new design rationales and insights, we develop a new family of practical implicitly authenticated DHKE protocols, which enjoy notable performance among security, privacy, efficiency and easy deployment. We make detailed comparisons between our new DHKE protocols and (H)MQV, showing that the newly developed protocols outperform HMQV in most aspects. Along the way, guided by our new design rationales, we also identify a new vulnerability (H)MQV, which brings some new perspectives (e.g., computational fairness) to the literature

Topics: Computer Science - Cryptography and Security, Computer Science - Data Structures and Algorithms
Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:arXiv.org:1105.1071
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