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Incentives, choice and accountability in the provision of Public Services

By Timothy Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak

Abstract

This paper discusses a theoretical framework to study the issues of competition and incentives without relying on the standard profit-orientated "market" model in the context of the debates about public service reform in the UK. It uses the idea that the production of public services coheres around a mission, and discusses how decentralised service provision can raise productivity by matching motivated workers to their preferred missions. Our focus on competition and incentives cuts across traditional debates about public versus private ownership and allows for the possibility of involving private non-profits. We also address concerns about the consequences of allowing more flexibility in mission design and competition on inequality

Topics: HG Finance
Publisher: Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2003
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:36001
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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