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Insiders versus outsiders in monetary policymaking

By Timothy Besley, Neil Meads and Paolo Surico
Topics: HG Finance, HJ Public Finance
Publisher: American Economic Association
Year: 2008
DOI identifier: 10.1257/aer.98.2.218
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:33743
Provided by: LSE Research Online

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Citations

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