Location of Repository

“Pollution Havens” and the Regulation of Multinationals by Multiple Governments

By Xiaodong Wu

Abstract

This paper develops a common agency model to analyze the strategic interaction between governments in regulating “dirty” multinational firms. These firms possess private information about the degree of pollution associated with their production technologies. The study shows that the strategic behavior between non-cooperative governments, as a result of asymmetric information, works against the “pollution haven” hypothesis. The paper highlights the importance of factors that can dominate environmental costs in a government’s welfare maximization decision rather than those in a firm’s profit maximization decision. The paper also draw implications on the empirical studies of the “pollution haven” hypothesis

Topics: pollution haven, multinationals, common agency
Year: 2000
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.198.7673
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/v... (external link)
  • http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es20... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.