Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Multilaterally Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Random Aumann–Hildenbrand Macroeconomies

By Peter J. Hammond

Abstract

Abstract. By definition, multilaterally strategy-proof mechanisms are immune to manipulation not only by individuals misrepresenting their preferences, but also by finite coalitions exchanging tradeable goods on the side. Continuum economies are defined in which both agents ’ identifiers and their privately known characteristics are joint i.i.d. random variables. For such economies, conditions are given for multilateral strategy-proofness to imply decentralization by a budget constraint with linear prices for tradeable goods and lump-sum transfers independent of individual characteristics. Also, adapting Aumann’s [1964a] key proof avoids using Lyapunov’s theorem or its corollary, Richter’s theorem on integrating a correspondence w.r.t. a non-atomic measure

Year: 1999
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.198.252
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/v... (external link)
  • http://www-econ.stanford.edu/f... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.