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By Karen Bennett


Two versions of global supervenience have recently been distinguished from each other. I introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one of the three versions is equivalent to strong supervenience in every sense that matters, and that neither of the other two versions counts as a genuine determination relation. I conclude that global supervenience has little metaphysically distinctive value. Since its introduction, people have been alternately pleased and disappointed with global supervenience. On the one hand, it seems to have quite a lot of promise for capturing the idea that one set of properties depends upon another while neither making that dependency implausibly localized, nor implying that the very same things have the subvening and supervening properties. On the other hand, however, it has never been entirely clear whether it is strong enough to capture interesting dependencies. Clarifying these issues requires getting significantly clearer about just what global supervenience amounts to. I begin by distinguishing three different versions of global supervenience, and discussing the entailment relations among them, as well as between them and strong supervenience. I argu

Year: 2011
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