Existing literature on initial public offerings of a firm’s stock has taken into analysis only two parties of the issuer, the underwriter, the informed investor, either by neglecting one party for simplification or uniting it with another one as if they pursue the unique interests by forming a coalition. In point of fact, the issuer, the underwriter, the informed investors are separate entities. They have often conflicting objectives each other and act in a different and independent manner to seek for profits of their own by making the most of their information. The present article explicitly introduces into enquiry the aspect of the tripartite conflicting interests of initial public offerings and investigates the effects. 1 introduction It is very much documented that in the initial public offering(hereafter IPO) of the firm there are wide spread underpricing phenomena. There have appeared many theoretical articles so far. Allen and Faulhaber(1989), Welch(1989) ascribe
To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.