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Credit in a Random Matching Model with Private Information

By S. Rao Aiyagari and Stephen D. Williamson

Abstract

We consider a random matching model without monetary exchange where agents have complete access to each others’ histories. Exchange is motivated by risk sharing given random unobservable incomes. There is capital accumulation and an endogenous interest rate. The key feature of this environment is that information is mobile across locations even while goods are not. Optimal allocations in the dynamic private information environment resemble real-world credit arrangements in that there ar

Year: 1997
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.194.5772
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