and to Dash Optimization for the free academic use of their Xpress-MP software. The authors wish to acknowledge FCC staff Mark Bykowsky, William Sharkey, and Martha Stancill for input and helpful comments. The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Communications Commission, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, or other members of the Commission's staff. Furthermore, any views expressed in this report are not purported to reflect those of Caltech and the University of Virginia. This work was conducted under FCC contract CON0500012. Executive Summary Laboratory experiments were run to evaluate a modified form of flexible package bidding (MPB) and bidding on hierarchically structured packages, or “tiered package bidding ” (TPB). The simultaneous, multi-round auction (SMR) without package bidding was included to provide a benchmark. The auction procedures were implemented with the jAuctions program developed by Jacob Goeree at Caltech. Each laboratory session consisted of a series of auctions in which participants were assigned “national ” or “regional ” bidder roles. Bidders were provided with randomly generated license values and information about the extent to which combinations of licenses were worth more tha
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