Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) have recently been enhanced to provide additional guarantees for the accuracy, reliability and coverage of their services. These infrastructures are intended to be robust against jamming. They support self-diagnostic error detection and provide end-users with detailed information about precision and integrity. In consequence, they are gradually being introduced into safety-related applications. This paper argues that greater attention needs to be paid to the ways in which these navigation infrastructures are being integrated into the safety cases that support Safety of Life (SoL) applications. In particular, we contrast the significant investments that have been made in analysing the safety of GNSS aviation applications, such as en-route operations and non-precision approaches, with the relative lack of progress in other industries. There is also a need for greater consistency between the safety arguments that support similar GNSS applications. This helps to ensure that safety managers and regulators consider a similar set of hazards when seeking to integrate these new navigation infrastructures into SoL systems. While international aviation organisations have taken important steps to establish communication mechanisms within their industry, the same cannot be said for most other industries. The ad hoc nature of the safety arguments supporting many recent proposals creates a danger that technological innovation will outstrip our commitment to mitigate or avoid future hazards. Unless these issues are address then accidents involving the first wave of SoL applications will further jeopardise the development of GNSS infrastructures. 1
To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.