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Modeling and Analyzing Security in the Presence of Compromising Adversaries ⋆

By David Basin and Cas Cremers

Abstract

Abstract. We present a framework for modeling adversaries in security protocol analysis, ranging from a Dolev-Yao style adversary to more powerful adversaries who can reveal different parts of principals ’ states during protocol execution. Our adversary models unify and generalize many existing security notions from both the computational and symbolic settings. We extend an existing symbolic protocol-verification tool with our adversary models, resulting in the first tool that systematically supports notions such as weak perfect forward secrecy, key compromise impersonation, and adversaries capable of state-reveal queries. In case studies, we automatically find new attacks and rediscover known attacks that previously required detailed manual analysis.

Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.190.7386
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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