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Matching and Price Competition: Comment By FUHITO KOJIMA*

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Abstract

The theory of two-sided matching markets has interested researchers for its theoretical appeal and relevance to real-life applications. The matching of medical residents and hospitals in the United States has been studied extensively by Alvin E. Roth (1984) and others. The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), the matching authority in the US hospital-resident matching market, runs a centralized matching mechanism that is a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm of David Gale and Lloyd S. Shapley (1962), redesigned by Roth and Elliott Peranson (1999). A recent antitrust case against the NRMP charged that the centralized matching mechanis

Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.190.3273
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