In 1999, in the wake of the two previous years of international financial turmoil in East Asia and elsewhere, two new intergovernmental institutions were created by the G-7 to assist in regulating global finance. The first, the Financial Stability Forum, brought together representatives from G-7 countries and from existing international institutions concerned with international financial regulation. The second, the Group of 20, brought together finance ministers and central bank governors from the G-7 and from twelve non-G-7 emerging market countries, along with highlevel representatives from EU, the IMF and the World Bank. This was accompanied by much discussion and further changes in existing institutions as part of the focus on reform of the international financial architecture. The relatively rapid creation of two new international institutions, under any circumstances, but especially in an issue area which is thought to be notoriously difficult to regulate, offers interesting opportunities to apply or reconsider existing theories of international institutions. The severe practical consequences of the crisis to which these institutions are designed to respond further contributes to the importance of analysing them. At first glance it appears that these developments can be fairly easily explained b
To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.