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Revolving Door Lobbyists ∗

By Jordi Blanes, Vidal Mirko and Draca Christian Fons-rosen

Abstract

Washington’s ‘revolving door ’-the movement from government service into the lobbying industryis regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24 % drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician

Topics: Lobbying, Revolving Door, US Congress, Political Connections, Political Elites. JEL Classification, H11, J24, J45. ∗We thank Nick Bloom, Steve Machin, Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, Yona Rubinstein and Ken Shepsle for insightful comments. We also thank participants in the LSE/NYU P, the Public
Year: 2010
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.187.543
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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