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I. The Mind-Body Problem after Kripke

By Paul Boghossian, Christopher Peacocke, Clarendon Press and Thomas Nagel


This essay will explore an approach to the mind-body problem that is distinct both from dualism and from the sort of conceptual reduction of the mental to the physical that proceeds via causal behaviorist or functionalist analysis of mental concepts. The essential element of the approach is that it takes the subjective phenomenological features of conscious experience to be perfectly real and not reducible to anything else--but nevertheless holds that their systematic relations to neurophysiology are not contingent but necessary. A great deal of effort and ingenuity has been put into the reductionist program, and there have been serious attempts in recent years to accommodate within a functionalist framework consciousness and phenomenological qualia in particular.

Year: 2011
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