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Chapter VIII The Harsanyi Value SERGIU

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Abstract

We study multiperson games in coalitional (or, characteristic) function form. The problem we address here is that of developing general principles for solving such a game. Consider first transferable utility (TU)-games. An approach with a long tradition in economics would proceed by assigning to every player his direct marginal contribution t

Year: 2010
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.178.7922
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