Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Delay and Information Aggregation in Stopping Games with Private Information

By Pauli Murto and Juuso Välimäki

Abstract

We consider a timing game with private information about a common values payoff parameter. Information is only transmitted through the stopping decisions and therefore the model is one of observational learning. We characterize the symmetric equilibria of the game and we show that even in large games where pooled information is sufficiently accurate for first best decisions, aggregate randomness in outcomes persists. Furthermore, the best symmetric equilibrium induces delay relative to the first best

Year: 2009
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.178.5559
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/v... (external link)
  • http://hse-econ.fi/murto/Infor... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.